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Abstract: Efficient protection scheme against out-of-step (OS) condi-
tions based on fuzzy logic (FL) technique is presented. The protection
proposed makes use of an adaptive-network-based fuzzy inference
system (ANFIS). The FL-based OS protection scheme developed has
been thoroughly optimized and tested with ATP-generated case sig-
nals. The scheme designed displays almost perfect efficiency and
high speed of OS detection. With the scheme designed the OS cases
are identified much earlier comparing to standard impedance-based
protection schemes. Wide robustness features of the ANFIS-based
scheme have also been achieved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting of a generator against faults and other abnormal
conditions requires different types of protective functions.
With such possible abnormal circumstances in mind as faults
in windings, overload, overheating of windings or bearings,
motoring, single phase or unbalanced current operation, over-
speed, out-of-step, etc., traditional protection schemes consist
usually of a number of discrete protective relays, which are
combined together with external auxiliary relays and wiring to
produce the necessary trip logic. The amount of protection that
should be applied for given machine varies according to the
size and importance of the generating unit.
In this research the main attention was focused on the
problems related with the detection of out-of-step conditions.
The latter may occur in the aftermath of loss of excitation or
pole slipping. Various methods for the OS detection have been
developed so far and are still in use in protection practice.
Among others, the following are worth to be mentioned [1-5]:
tracking trajectory of the impedance vector measured at the
generator terminals, methods based on the equal area criterion,
Liapunov theory, apparent resistance augmentation or obser-
vations of the voltage phase differences between substations.
In this paper the results of investigation on application of
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to out-of-step protection
is presented, with special attention paid to fuzzy logic (FL)
inference algorithms. New FL-based protection schemes,
which ensure faster and more secure detection of generator
loss of synchronism, have been developed and tested. The
paper starts with an introduction to fuzzy inference systems
(section II), then the new FIS-based protection is described
(section III) and its design and testing results are presented
(section IV). Finally, robustness analysis of the scheme and
comparison with standard OS protection are shown (section
V), followed by concluding remarks (section VI), which close
the paper.
II. FUZZY LOGIC INFERENCE METHODS
The family of algorithms based on fuzzy approach was in-
troduced to power system protection at the beginning of last
decade. The new techniques met considerable approval for the
sake of ability to describe quantitatively the uncertainties ap-
pearing during the operation of protective relay. Implementa-
tion of fuzzy criteria signals together with fuzzy settings
brings antidotes to uncertainties caused by dynamic measure-
ment errors and may constitute a remedy against problems
related with sharp boundaries in the universe of criteria signals
between areas of faulty and failure-free operation of a pro-
tected plant. The use of fuzzy algebra rules in the process of
aggregation of different in nature and reliability protection
criteria enables easy realization of multi-criteria decision-
making. Sample applications of this approach to power system
protection include fault type identification [6], multi-criteria
protection of power transformers [7], etc.
Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) employ the theory of fuzzy
sets and fuzzy if-then rules to derive an output. Various types
of FIS are often used either for fuzzy modeling or fuzzy classi-
fication purposes. Typically an FIS scheme performs its action
in several steps including (Fig. 1):
• fuzzification (comparing the input values with membership
functions to obtain membership values of each linguistic
term),
• fuzzy reasoning (firing the rules and generating their fuzzy
or crisp consequents),
• defuzzification (aggregating rule consequents to produce a
crisp output).
The investigations described here have been done for a
Sugeno-type FIS structure [8] (Fig. 2a), where the output of
each rule (y1 ... yn) is a linear combination of input variables
(x1, x2, x3) plus a constant term, and the final output z is the
weighted average of each rule’s output:
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Fig. 1. Fuzzy reasoning system.
nnn
www
ywywyw
z
+++
+++
=
...
...
21
2211            (1)
kkkkk dxcxbxay +++= 321            (2)
)()()( 332211 xxxw kkkk µµµ=            (3)
where:
{ }iHIGHiMEDIUMiLOWiik x µµµµ ,,)( ∈  - membership functions
(MF) for the linguistic terms LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH associated
with the i-th input signal,
wi - weighting factor for the i-th rule consequent.
In the design phase the FIS examined were represented as
adaptive multi-layer feed-forward networks (ANFIS) [9]. The
structure of an ANFIS with three inputs and one output is
shown in Fig. 2b. The ANFIS consists of three layers of nodes
performing different operations on incoming signals. The
nodes in particular layers are responsible for determination of
membership grades for each linguistic term, executing the
rules and generating the weighted output. Additional factor is
introduced to normalize the firing strengths of the rules with
respect to the sum of all firing strengths. The possibility of
parameters adjusting via training (similar as for neural net-
work schemes) is an important feature of the ANFIS structure.
A hybrid training algorithm being a combination of the least
squares method and back-propagation gradient descent method
was used here to prepare the FIS for the OS classification task.
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Fig. 2. FIS studied: a) general structure, b) adaptive network representation.
III. FIS-BASED OS PROTECTION SCHEME
The general scheme of the FL-based scheme developed is
shown in Fig. 3. The reasoning part of the protection is real-
ized with help of the FIS performing a kind of pattern recog-
nition with appropriately chosen vector of criterion signal
samples. The decision (criterion) values have to be previously
calculated from available power system signals with use of
dedicated digital processing algorithms. Orthogonal compo-
nents of phase voltages and currents are calculated first with
use of full-cycle Fourier filters, basing on which further crite-
rion signals are determined.
The FIS input vector consists of a number of signal samples
captured with use of a sliding data window (DW), as shown in
Fig. 4. Chosen criterion signal is observed with the measure-
ment rate MR within the DW having the length being a multi-
ple of MR and number of samples m (DWL=MR*m). Constant
value of m=3 was kept in this case, while MR was being var-
ied in the range (80–480) ms, which resulted in DWL from the
interval (160–960) ms. The data window beginning (DWB -
measured from the fault inception time), is moving and thus
consecutive sets of signal samples (input vectors X(k)) are
delivered to the FIS-based reasoning unit.
The FIS applied is assumed to produce output equal to 0 for
stable patterns and 1 for OS conditions. For classification
purposes a threshold value set to 0.5 is introduced. All the
cases for which the FIS output is lower than 0.5 are classified
as stable and those for which the threshold is exceeded are
recognized as OS cases.
The FIS-based reasoning unit itself has the following design
parameters:
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Fig. 3. General structure of the FIS-based OS protection.
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Fig. 4. Data capturing with sliding data window.
• type - Sugeno,
• 3-sample data window,
• triangle membership functions,
• 3 linguistic terms (low, medium, high) for each input MF,
• 27 linear terms for output MFs,
• 27 rules (resulting from number of inputs and MF terms),
• rule weights and connections set to 1,
• fuzzy operators: product (and), maximum (or), product
(implication), maximum (aggregation), center of gravity
(defuzzification),
• initial FIS structure generated with grid partitioning of the
data, then trained.
The detailed shape and parameters of the membership func-
tions as well as values of coefficients in (2) are tuned during
training with a set of signals obtained from simulation of a test
power system with use of ATP software package.
IV. OS PROTECTION SCHEME TRAINING
AND EVALUATION
A. Data for scheme training and testing
Similar as in case of neural networks, chosen ANFIS net-
works have been trained with a set of input-output patterns
generated with ATP simulation program. To obtain data for
training of ANFIS and further testing of the OS protection, a
simple single machine – infinite bus system was modeled (Fig.
5). The synchronous machine G1 was connected to the infinite
bus system S1 via a block transformer T1 and a 200-km long
double-circuit overhead line L1. Within the transmission line a
total of 108 symmetrical faults on one of the line circuits were
applied, some of them responsible for further developing OS
conditions [10].
Additional testing cases for robustness analysis were also
prepared including unsymmetrical short-circuit cases as well
as 3-phase fault cases for other machine ratings (generators
G2,3 with corresponding transformers T2,3 – Fig. 5).
Generator output voltages and currents as well as its angular
speed were registered in ATP output files. Additional features
like voltage/current amplitudes, components of generator
power etc.  were obtained after digital processing of voltage
and current signals. In order to choose the best signals for
application as FIS input features, the statistical properties of
available signals were determined [11]. In the investigated
case the most valuable recognition feature turned out to be the
machine angular frequency deviation ∆ω, followed by the
impedance angle Arg(Z) measured at the machine terminals.
All the results described below have been obtained for the
scheme fed with ∆ω signal only.
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Fig. 5. Test power system modeled in ATP.
B. OS protection efficiency assessment
The proposed FL-based OS detection scheme was put to
extensive tests, which brought about promising results with
regard to the detection speed and classification efficiency.
Fig. 6 presents the values of average FIS output errors (as a
function of time after fault switching-off) understood as the
difference between ideal values (0, 1) and actual value ob-
served at the FIS output. As one can notice, higher FIS output
errors occur for the initial time period, where no significant
OS symptoms can really be observed. The values of FIS out-
put errors decrease with time passing and the classification
process becomes more and more reliable. Better results are
always obtained for longer DWLs, for which more informa-
tion about phenomena to be classified is available.
The relationship of the FIS classification efficiency (per-
centage of correctly classified cases)  vs. time (DWB location)
for various values of DWL is shown in Fig. 7. As could be
expected, extending the DWL implicates better operation
results of the scheme. Naturally, the FIS output becomes more
accurate and the classification more reliable when the DW is
moved with time towards “better developed” (more clearly
recognizable) OS symptoms.
Valuable information on the FIS operation results deliver
the indices of average efficiency and average output errors
gathered in Table 1. The average values were calculated over
all 108 fault cases and time instants for which the FIS rules
were fired (0–500ms after fault switching-off).
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Fig. 6. Average FIS output error vs. time (DWB location).
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Fig. 7. Average FIS operation efficiency vs. time (DWB location).
Table 1. Average parameters of FIS operation.
FIS efficiency (%) FIS output errors (pu)DWL
(ms) a) b) c) a) b) c)
160 97.3 97.4 96.4 0.108 0.105 0.167
320 99.1 98.6 99.1 0.084 0.079 0.107
480 99.2 100.0 97.8 0.061 0.063 0.085
640 99.7 99.5 99.8 0.042 0.047 0.055
800 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.030 0.033 0.042
960 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.020 0.016 0.026
a) FIS trained and tested with all the patterns, b) FIS trained and tested with
half of the patterns, c) FIS tested with second half of the patterns.
Table 2. Error-free operation of the FIS-based scheme.
DWL
(ms)
DWB
(ms)
Dec. time
(ms)
FIS error
(pu)
160 480 740 0.071
320 200 520 0.095
480 200 680 0.073
640 120 760 0.061
800 80 880 0.049
960 80 1040 0.034
It may be noticed that the average efficiency of 99% and
better is achieved for DWL equal or greater than 320 ms. The
longer DW is applied, the lower FIS output errors appear and
the better classification results are obtained. A reasonable
compromise between DWL and FIS efficiency has, however,
to be worked out when possibly earliest decision is to be is-
sued. The FIS generalization properties can be studied ana-
lyzing columns b) and c) in Table 1. As usual, the scheme
operation is worse for cases unseen during training (output
errors higher, efficiency lower). However, the results obtained
do not differ drastically from those achieved for training pat-
terns, thus confirming quite good general qualification of the
scheme for the OS classification task.
In Table 2 the FIS operation parameters assuring error-free
recognition are gathered. It can be seen that the effectiveness
of 100% (all cases properly classified) is achieved at t=200ms
for DWL=320ms but also at t=120ms for DWL=640ms and at
t=80 ms for DWL≥800ms. It means that the error-free classifi-
cation of OS conditions with designed FIS may be expected at
the earliest 520 ms after fault switching-off, which is similar
as by the neural OS detection scheme described in [10].
Moreover, the greater value of DWL, the smaller average FIS
output and the recognition more reliable, however, not optimal
as far as the classification speed is concerned.
C. Optimization analysis
In order to check the optimality of the FIS recognition unit
designed, further analysis for various parameters, possibly
having an impact on the scheme operation, have been per-
formed. Table 3 presents the efficiency and average output
error obtained for one specific FIS structure (∆ω input signal,
DWL=320ms) with different shape of the membership func-
tions and number of the MF terms (3 – as previously, 2 and 4).
Looking at the results one can surely notice that the worst
FIS operation parameters are obtained when the membership
functions adopted have two linguistic terms only. For such an
arrangement the average FIS output error has increased by 25–
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Efficiency (%) Average output error (pu)ape
MFT=2 MFT=3 MFT=4 MFT=2 MFT=3 MFT=4
e 98.9 99.1 99.1 0.100 0.084 0.069
oid 96.0 99.1 99.5 0.116 0.080 0.039
98.8 99.3 99.4 0.094 0.071 0.052
99.1 99.1 99.3 0.090 0.077 0.058
ped 95.4 99.1 99.1 0.132 0.084 0.043
d 97.0 99.1 99.4 0.116 0.073 0.052
Table 4. FIS operation parameters for other decision vectors.
Input vector X Effi-
ciency
(%)
Aver.
error (pu)
100%
dec. time
(ms)
∆ω input vector 99.1 0.095 520
[∆ω, ∆ω, ArgZ]a) 96.3 0.104 720
[∆ω, ∆ω, ArgZ]b) 99.3 0.040 520
[∆ω, ArgZ, ArgZ]c) 99.0 0.054 480
[∆ω, ArgZ, Ppost-fault]d) 99.3 0.062 560
[∆ω, ArgZ, Ppre-fault]e) 99.2 0.059 520imultaneously the classification efficiency has dropped
ximum 3.5%, depending on the MF shape. The best
 are achieved for MFT=4, however, the difference ob-
is not very significant. The relationship of FIS effi-
 vs. MF shape is distinctive for MFT=2 only and be-
 flat for higher number of MF terms. The gauss-shaped
eem to be most promising in the investigated case.
ing the shape and number of terms of MFs for given
tion should, however, be done with great care, having
d the possibility of on-line implementation of the
e. Applying non-linear MFs and high MFT values en-
onsiderable increase of computational burden by exe-
the FIS algorithm. One ought to bear in mind that the
r of rules to be fired at each time step is a power func-
 MFT and number of FIS inputs m (MFT3 in this case).
aking MFT=4 instead of 3 increases the set of FIS rules
es – from 27 up to 64.
her tests have been done for chosen FIS structure
triangle’, DWL=320 ms, MFT=3) fed with other com-
decision vectors including, apart from ∆ω input, also
nce angle and active power components:
)=[∆ω(k+DWL/2)–∆ω(k), ∆ω( k+DWL)
    –∆ω( k+DWL/2), ArgZ(k+DWL)–ArgZ(k+DWL/2)],
)=[∆ω(k+DWL)–∆ω(k), ∆ω( k+DWL),
      ArgZ(k+DWL)],
)=[∆ω(k+DWL), ArgZ(k+DWL)–ArgZ(k+DWL/2),
      ArgZ(k+DWL)],
)=[∆ω(k+DWL), ArgZ(k+DWL), P(post-fault)],
)=[∆ω(k+DWL), ArgZ(k+DWL), P(pre-fault)].
 can observe (Table 4) that, apart form the vector a), all
e combinations used as FIS inputs brought comparable
. Taking only the time differences of ∆ω and Arg(Z) (no
n actual value of input signals) makes the recognition
ss efficient and much slower than for other input vec-
rror-free operation (all cases correctly classified) was
d at the earliest for vector c) – 480 ms after fault
ing-off.
V. ROBUSTNESS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Robustness analysis
Similarly as by the neural OS detection scheme [10], the de-
signed FIS were put to additional tests with the signals coming
from other power system fault cases, as mentioned in section
IV.A. First, 72 cases of single and double phase faults within
line L1 (Fig. 1) were prepared, some of them being responsi-
ble for OS conditions after short-circuit switching-off. The
other group of 72 testing cases was prepared by simulating
various three-phase faults within line L1 but for the other two
synchronous machines (G2, G3 as in [10]).
Three different FIS structures having DWL=320, 560 and
800ms have been chosen for robustness analysis. The average
results of testing (over time and all fault cases), along with
data for initial parameters (results for training data set) are
gathered in Table 5. It can be observed that the scheme oc-
curred to be quite robust against both different fault types and
other synchronous machine ratings. The average classification
efficiency has dropped by 1–3% in comparison with the re-
sults for training patterns. Smaller drops were achieved for
structures with greater DWL (efficiency still above 99%).
Table 5. Robustness studies - average classification efficiency.
Efficiency (%)Input vector
X(k)
DWL
(ms) a) b) c)
320 99.1 95.7 96.0
560 99.3 96.5 97.3∆ω samples
800 100.0 99.1 98.7
a) results for training patterns,
b) testing with unsymmetrical fault cases,
c) testing with signals for other synchronous machines.
Analysis for other decision vectors has shown that increased
robustness of the OS detection scheme may be obtained when
the information on pre-fault active power is also included
(vector e), section IV.C).
B. Comparison with standard OS protection scheme
In the capacity of standard OS protection, various imped-
ance-based solutions may be considered [12]. A stand-alone
MHO characteristic, single or double blinders with or without
MHO element, double or triple lens schemes or concentric
circle scheme may be used, to name only the most popular
versions. For the purpose of comparison with the AI-based
scheme developed, a double-blinder + MHO OS detection
scheme was modeled, as shown in Fig. 8. All the impedances
in Fig. 8 are given in (Ω) as viewed from the generator termi-
nals (17.5kV bus).
The scheme consists of two blinder couples  - outer (lines
A, D) and inner (lines B, C), with assistance of the supervisory
MHO circle (E). In the sample OS case shown in Fig. 8, the
inner blinder area (B-D) is entered twice by the trajectory of
impedance Z measured at the machine terminals (curve
marked with points (1) – (11)). After fault inception the im-
pedance vector moves rapidly from the load area (1) to the
fault region (4), within a very short traverse time t3–t2 between
line
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Table 6. Operation parameters of the standard (STD) and FIS schemes.
min mean max
le slip observed at t (ms) 620 860 1500
etection with STD scheme at t (ms) 545 810 1580
etection with FIS-based scheme at t (ms) 440 505 520s A and B. After fault switching-off the impedance trajec-
 leaves the blinder area moving towards the load region,
ever, shortly after that it begins to move counterclockwise
 crosses the entire blinder-MHO characteristic. The A-B
erse time t8–t7 is much longer than previously which con-
s that severe power swing takes place. The out-of-step is
ected and tripping command issued when the left outer
der D is passed (10) or the supervisory MHO element is
et (11), depending on the particular logic being used. It can
seen that the impedance trajectory around point (11) is no
ger smooth but rather spring-shaped. This is an effect of
reasing errors of measurement with the algorithms set for
z voltage and current signals, while the generator speed
iation in that region reaches quite high values.
he above OS protection scheme was “executed” for all
ulated fault cases. All the OS cases were recognized, with
 average detection parameters as given in Table 6. The
ection statistics show that the standard OS scheme modeled
s able to recognize pole slipping conditions just before (or
se after) it actually took place. The time needed to issue the
ping command was dependent on the phenomena dynamics
 each specific case. On the contrary, the FIS-based protec-
 developed was able to recognize all OS cases within
ms. It means that for most of the cases a prediction instead
etection action was really performed.
ig. 9 presents chosen four cases of OS conditions repre-
ted by a ∆ω waveform, along with the corresponding out-
s of the developed FIS detection scheme (FIS) and the
edance-based double-blinder scheme (STD) adopted. One
 notice that the FIS scheme recognized all of the four
ulation runs as OS cases at t=520 ms after fault inception.
 standard OS detector needed 545 up to 1580ms, and thus
s 25–1060ms slower as the scheme developed, depending
the dynamics of the ∆ω changes for given cases. The STD
orithm was not able to issue its decision on OS conditions
il considerable angular frequency deviation of about 15–20
/s (2.4–3.2 Hz) was observed. Contrary, in case of FL-
ed scheme the detection was made basing on the early
tle symptoms of coming generator instability.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A new approach to out-of-step protection applying fuzzy in-
ference methods has been proposed in the paper. The FIS-
based scheme developed displays high efficiency and very
short time of OS detection. Comparing to other existing im-
pedance OS protection devices, a kind of prediction of coming
machine instability is performed instead of traditional detec-
tion of actually occurring phenomena. The decision is taken
within approx. 500ms after fault inception, thus leaving
enough time for an appropriate action (tripping, fast valving)
to protect the generator from stresses and preserve the stability
of power system.
The OS protection scheme proposed makes use of the adap-
tive network version of FIS. With such an arrangement all the
advantages of fuzzy processing are combined with the virtues
of training on examples, as in case of neural networks. Thus
all the problems connected with burdensome heuristic setting
process of the fuzzy system are avoided and a kind of optimi-
zation is realized.
The OS protection developed has been thoroughly tested
with ATP-generated power system signals. Wide robustness
features of the scheme with respect to both different fault
types and other synchronous machine ratings have also been
confirmed.
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